Apologies for the appalling delay in part 2 of this article – other considerations intervened. Anyone who was genuinely waiting with bated breath can at least comfort themselves that they've achieved a unique distinction.

After the fun of taking apart various common assumptions about the failings of the 21st century Yankees – which was attempted in part 1, if you can recall that far back - it's time to get down to the real task of coming up with some alternate theories. These hypotheses may not seem particularly exotic or original. However, they seem to have one common factor: the Yankees have done little to rectify these perceived flaws successfully.

The Yankees have tried to sign proven postseason performers (Sheffield, Randy Johnson), they've tried playing small-ball (Womack), they've tried getting somewhat younger (Nick Johnson, Weaver, Cano), they've tried stocking up on pitching (Pavano, Wright, Weaver, Contreras). Admittedly, some of these haven't been executed very well, with one of the historically poor modern seasons in Tony Womack's 2005. However, even he stole 27 bases, so it's not as if he wasn't more or less as advertised in terms of playing style.

Let us look, then, to less-discussed facets of the recent Yankees rosters to find our answers. In common with the last article, we're trying to explain why the Yankees' postseason success has suffered such a dramatic fall-off from 1996-2000 to 2001-5, despite the fact that their regular-season records remain comparable. We'll start with one weakness that appears to be painfully obvious to most Yankee watchers over the last few years, but that has not yet been the target of a major organizational overhaul:

1)The 'new' Yankees are much worse defensively.

Ask a Yankee-watcher about the team's defensive failings, and Bernie Williams' name is likely to be included in the first sentence you hear. Bernie's time with the Yankees has produced a Hall of Fame-quality career (or close enough for this admiring fan), as well as giving New York a consistent fulcrum around which they've built enormous success. However, it's inarguable that Williams' recent performances in the outfield have been the most apparent flaw in the Yankees' everyday lineup. But is the overall Yankee performance this bad, or is Bernie simply a standout for his exceptionally poor performance?

For the moment, let's start with a team-based method of defensive, that being Defensive Efficiency Rating – that is, the proportion of hits for each ball a hitter put in play against the Yankees that were 'fieldable' (not a home run). This is a quick, useful way to tell how effectively the Yankees as a team converted balls in play to outs, instead of singling out individuals' accomplishments (which might or might not be skewed by their fellow players). A higher DER is better:

	Yankees	League	WS winner
1996	.682	.683
1997	.685	.685	.691
1998	.708	.686
1999	.696	.683
2000	.693	.684
2001	.683	.690	.703
2002	.688	.695	.718
2003	.681	.694	.691
2004	.685	.689	.693
2005	.690	.695	.711

Based on this data, it appears fairly incontrovertible that the Yankees' defense has declined since the 1996-2000 dynastic run, dropping below average in 2001 and remaining there, after being above-average since 1997. Also, every other World Series winner has been better than the Yankees at turning balls in play into outs, and only the 2003 Marlins were worse than the league average (AL and NL). While we can't say with complete confidence that this is a major reason why the Yankees have struggled in the postseason, the trends shown certainly suggest a course of action.

So who's to blame? While Williams represents an obvious defensive liability that has required addressing for several offseasons now, it shouldn't be assumed that one change would have rectified all that has afflicted the Yankees in the field. Take a look at the Range Factor for the primary New York starters as a percentage of the league average since 1996 (excluding catchers and first basemen):

	2B	3B	SS	LF	CF	RF
1996	94%	102%	105%	73%	105%	120%
1997	86%	103%	109%	81%	92%	115%
1998	111%	120%	98%	115%	104%	112%
1999	102%	112%	94%	114%*	107%	109%
2000	91%	97%	87%	100%	99%	108%
2001	91%	97%	85%	85%	93%	83%
2002	93%	110%	84%	111%	86%	91%*
2003	96%	102%*	83%	92%	95%	102%
2004	100%	91%	98%	99%	89%	97%
2005	103%	95%	103%	99%	90%	94%

- For these years, playing time was split fairly evenly between multiple players without any dominant starter, so I've taken the total team RF at that position.

Now, obviously these Range Factor numbers are in no way definitive. Range Factor can be skewed by a lot of different factors, such as the groundball/flyball tendencies of a pitching staff, the configuration of a home park, and the positioning of a defense. There are several other, more intricate calculations that might provide additional or contradictory insights, and I hope to explore those in the future (although, given the lateness of this column, I shouldn't hold your breath).

Setting aside these objections for the moment, a quick scan of this mass of data leads to a few interesting observations. Such as: Chuck Knoblauch really appears to have been an excellent pickup in 1998 given the Yankees' defensive weakness at 2nd, and his arrival (with Brosius) coincided with one of the best-ever Yankee seasons defensively as well as in the W/L column. Derek Jeter's Gold Gloves have some merit in RF statistics, but also have been awarded just after Alex Rodriguez donned the pinstripes. Coincidence? You decide.

During 1996-2000, of the 30 yearly Range Factor position ratings above, 18 were above average, and one was average. From 2001-2005, of the corresponding 30 ratings, 6 were above average, and one was average. The only defensively beneficial additions to the Yankees have been one and a half years of Robin Ventura, a part-year of an occasionally healthy Rondell White, and Raul Mondesi's eventful time in right field. Robinson Cano was also relatively impressive in his 2005 debut. For the rest, it's been a tale of decline, injury, and poor performances.

The story remains dispiriting when focusing on the key defensive positions. Up the middle, 2B, SS, and CF have not gone well – although second finally appears on the way to decent defensive health, thanks to the arrival of Cano (who had an excellent defensive reputation in the minor leagues). However, Derek Jeter's sudden apparent improvement after hitting 30 may or may not be permanent, and the search for Williams' long-term replacement continues to grind on into its third year. This spells trouble, as none of the other defensive positions appear strong enough to compensate or cover in any significant way.

There's plenty more work to be done here, of course, but let's put this section aside for the moment. From it we should take the realization (which may or may not be new) that the Yankees' overall defense has been in decline since their dynastic years. While their regular-season accomplishments haven't appeared to suffer from it, their October fate has been radically different. Their counterparts who have newly hoisted World Series flags, on the other hand, have generally been stronger as a team defensively, even if their ability to win regular-season games was not remarkably better as a result.

2)The 'new' Yankees lack depth in the roster.

Again, the type of flaw that is noticeable from a casual fan's standpoint, but yet few significant steps appear to have been taken in attempts to improve the roster in this regard. Current Yankee fans will recite, with embarrassingly little prompting, the many incidents when roster depth has served New York well in the postseason. We think of Jim Leyritz's occasional October home runs, Luis Sojo's seeing-eye single in 2000, Chad Curtis going yard in the 1999 World Series, and so on. That's not to say that the Yankees have been particularly dependent on these events, just that they tend to stick in the mind.

Compare the 1996 Yankee roster to its 2005 counterpart. In New York's first World Series win of its dynasty run, they boasted a roster that contained four hitters that were above league-average using the OPS+ stat, yet were not every-day players. Leyritz, Strawberry, and Raines all managed to post OBPs in excess of .350 during the regular season, while Strawberry, Raines, and Fielder were power threats with SLG%s over .450. As a group, the bench hit .253/.339/.404 – not an impressive line, but bear in mind that this includes defensive replacements and prospects up for a cup of coffee.

In 2005, the bench was a very different animal, with not one player contributing an OPS+ higher than Felix Escalona's 95 in 14 at-bats before October. Of those who strode to the plate more than 50 times, Bubba Crosby's 67 OPS+ (two-thirds the value of an average AL hitter) was the best, out-hitting Ruben Sierra and Tony Womack. As a whole the bench hit .223/.265/.298, or slightly better than Womack's abysmal season. And while few of the bench saw much postseason action, the Yankees were effectively forced to start Crosby in the ALDS thanks to Bernie Williams' defense.

Quite a contrast, wouldn't you say? Those riding the pine in 2005 made the 1996 bench resemble an All-Star roster, while boasting as its best statistical hitter a 26-year old utility infielder with zero career home runs in the majors. In a postseason environment, where elite relievers are used to their limit, a timely pinch-hit can make all the difference, as the 1996-2000 Yankees would tell you – perhaps even more so in the World Series thanks to the need to hit for pitchers in NL parks.

Let's perform a similar breakdown as before for bench hitters on the Yankees over the last 10 years (with the World Series winner's data included too where appropriate):

	NYY BA	WS BA	NYY OBP	WS OBP	NYY SLG	WS SLG
1996	.253		.339		.404
1997	.269	.266	.348	.349	.389	.388
1998	.279		.345		.398
1999	.250		.317		.404
2000	.265		.336		.440
2001	.214	.265	.261	.343	.331	.412
2002	.239	.277	.300	.328	.363	.368
2003	.249	.239	.304	.314	.397	.391
2004	.234	.266	.315	.335	.373	.428
2005	.223	.236	.265	.289	.298	.351

These figures are naturally limited by the definition of 'bench' – some hitters will actually have had a full-time role for only part of a season, or will have been September call-ups. This data simply excludes the player from each position with the most at-bats from the regular season, and stats from pitchers' hitting. However, it does go some way to describe the amount of depth the team had for the postseason roster, and hence the depth available for the regular season too.

There's an unmistakable trend downwards in these numbers for New York, with a particularly dramatic drop-off between 2000 and 2001. The numbers move back up a little after 2001, but never approach the on-base skills of the 1996-8 bench players to which the Yankees had access, or the power of the 2000 bench. Only Florida, of the teams to hold the World Series trophy after 2000, could be said to have had a weaker bench, and even then it's a close-run thing.

Again, more analysis will be of use here, but an initial glance strongly suggests that New York has had trouble putting together an effective bench since their last victorious October – trouble that their competitors have managed to deal with rather better, and that their predecessors seldom encountered. Might that be a contributing factor as to why the recent Yankees' postseason fortunes have been meager?

While we're here, let's throw in the bullpen and backup pitchers as well. New York's superlative closer has of course been a near-constant over the last decade, but what about those middle relievers and emergency starters? Here's a comparison of the pitching staff in recent years that did not qualify either as members of the team's rotation, or as closers on Baseball Reference.com:

	NYY ERA	WS ERA	NY WHIP	WS WHIP
1996	5.21		1.55
1997	4.07	4.16	1.45	1.54
1998	4.29		1.39
1999	4.07		1.46
2000	4.89		1.54
2001	4.25	4.41	1.47	1.43
2002	4.11	3.61	1.43	1.31
2003	3.98	4.67	1.42	1.52
2004	5.39	4.48	1.56	1.48
2005	5.16	3.46	1.51	1.38

Very little of a trend to identify here, to my chagrin. New York's setup and reserve pitchers do appear to have imploded recently, but only in the last couple of years rather than the dramatic step-change we saw for the hitters after 2000. The World Series winners who replaced the Yankees at the pinnacle of the baseball world also have an uneven record of demonstrating depth in pitching, with the Diamondbacks and Marlins both indifferent in this regard.

Of course, there are important flaws with this method. The weakest pitchers will have been left off the postseason roster – although the same could be said of bench players, and that data at least suggested a supporting trend. On the other hand, many bench players in the form of pinch-hitters are selected purely on hitting ability, whereas for a relief pitcher or reserve starter, they are less likely to be inserted into the highest-leverage situations if the manager can avoid it, so could be innings-eaters. This may dictate where talent is spread, although I must admit to having little idea how to account for this in the data.

Let's leave this section, too, with the acknowledgment that while my amateur methods are severely crude, and certainly don't come close to the increasingly painstaking methods of the sabermetricians out there, there does seem to be some data in this column that suggests a trend. The Yankees have suffered in their ability to record outs defensively, and have seen their strength in reserve (particularly among the hitters) fade in the last few years, even though they have continued to prosper between April and September.

Whether or not this has been a significant factor in their postseason returns over the last decade requires more data, more analysis, and definitely more incisive minds than my own. With luck, I'll be able to pilfer some of that wisdom in the weeks and months to come, and try to improve on this work. In the meantime, I hope this was of interest to some.

Ben Thacker